At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law (...) and morality, and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments together support a nonpositivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua comprehensive theory of law. (shrink)

Background and aim With the increasing interest in lifestyle, health and consequences of unhealthy lifestyles for the healthcare system, a new kind of solidarity is gaining importance: lifestyle solidarity. While it might not seem fair to let other people pay for the costs arising from an unhealthy lifestyle, it does not seem fair either to punish people for their lifestyle. However, it is not clear how solidarity is assessed by people, when considering disease risks or lifestyle risks. The aim of (...) this study was to investigate the degree of solidarity with lifestyle as well as with other factors that are related to health outcomes—for example, old age—and the relation between this degree of solidarity and various characteristics. Methods This cross-sectional study is part of the Dutch longitudinal SMILE study. Data on the degree of solidarity with different lifestyles and old age, and the relation between the degree of solidarity and various demographic and other variables were obtained in a questionnaire survey. Results Solidarity with smokers and overweight people was moderate, as was solidarity with older people. Respondents were ambivalent about athletes. Respondents who were younger, male and highly educated, and those with a healthy lifestyle, a small social network, high quality of life and an internal locus of control, showed low solidarity. Conclusions Solidarity with an unhealthy lifestyle and old age is moderate and the degree of solidarity varies among the different subgroups. (shrink)

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism. James Griffin and Yael Tamir raise questions concerning Raz's notion of group rights and its application to claims of cultural and political autonomy, while Will Kymlicka and Bernhard Peters examine Raz's theory of multicultural society. Lukas Meyer investigates the (...) applicability of the notion of harm in the intergenerational context. Other papers are devoted to fundamental theoretical tenets of Raz's work. Hillel Steiner and Andrei Marmor examine Raz's account of value pluralism and incommensurability in light of what these authors consider to be goods whose equal distribution must be valued for its own sake. Robert Alexy and Timothy Endicott discuss traditional issues of jurisprudence and legal philosphy with special attention to Raz's contribution. Rüdiger Bittner, Bruno Celano, and J. E. Penner discuss and criticize aspects of Raz's theory of practical reason. Jeremy Waldron presents a critique of Raz's interpretation of authority.This volume concludes with a chapter by Joseph Raz in which he responds to arguments in the foregoing essays. (shrink)

The questions of how human beings produce and comprehend language continue to engage a variety of researchers and scholars, and it is becoming increasingly clear that only interdisciplinary approaches will yield productive answers. This complex issue of discourse processing is the subject of this volume, and the contributors address it from the varying perspectives of cognitive psychology linguistics, and computer science. The chapters provide a fascinating overview of emerging theories in the new discipline of cognitive science. A useful introductory chapter (...) by the editors explains the relationships of chapters to one another and outlines the long-term implications of the work they report. (shrink)

Previous research demonstrates that implicitly learned probability information can guide visual attention. We examined whether the probability of an object changing can be implicitly learned and then used to improve change detection performance. In a series of six experiments, participants completed 120–130 training change detection trials. In four of the experiments the object that changed color was the same shape on every trial. Participants were not explicitly aware of this change probability manipulation and change detection performance was not improved for (...) the trained shape versus untrained shapes. In two of the experiments, the object that changed color was always in the same general location . Although participants were not explicitly aware of the change probability, implicit knowledge of it did improve change detection performance in the trained location. These results indicate that improved change detection performance through implicitly learned change probability occurs for location but not shape. (shrink)

Smilek, Eastwood, Reynolds, and Kingstone suggests that the studies reported in Beck, M. R., Levin, D. T. and Angelone, B. A. are not ecologically valid. Here, we argue that not only are change blindness and change blindness blindness studies in general ecologically valid, but that the studies we reported in Beck, Levin, and Angelone, 2007 are as well. Specifically, we suggest that many of the changes used in our study could reasonably be expected to occur in the real world. Furthermore, (...) the conclusion from Beck et al. that knowledge about the role of intention and scene complexity in change detection is not readily accessible applies not only to the laboratory studies we conducted but also to real world situations. (shrink)

Alexy confronts the legal positivist view in this classic work of legal philosophy. He formulates an accessible concept of law that systematically links classical elements of legal positivism with nonpositivistic legal theory, challenging the prevailing orthodoxies of modern jurisprudence.

Gustav Radbruch war Deutschlands beruhmtester Rechtsphilosoph im 20. Jahrhundert. Seine gehaltvollen, aber auch spannungsreichen Schriften pragen die deutschsprachige Rechtsphilosophie bis heute. Im Zentrum von Radbruchs Lehre steht sein neukantianisch gepragter Rechtsbegriff, der im Laufe der Zeit eine Reihe von Veranderungen erfahren hat. Die Beitrage in diesem Band sind Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff im Allgemeinen und den Wandlungen dieses Rechtsbregriffs im Besonderen gewidmet. Nach der orthodoxen Lesart vertrat Radbruch vor dem Kriege eine rechtspositivistische Lehre, wurde unter dem Eindruck der nationalsozialistischen Grauel jedoch zum (...) Naturrecht bekehrt. Zunehmend wird gesehen, dass diese 'Bekehrungsthese' zu Ungereimtheiten fuhrt. Verschiedene Beitrage dieses Bandes betonen demgegenuber die Kontinuitat nichtpositivistischer Elemente in der Entwicklung von Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff. Mit Beitragen von: Hidehiko Adachi, Martin Borowski, Horst Dreier, Ralf Dreier, An dreas Funke, Ulfrid Neumann, Stanley L. Paulson, Joachim Renzikowski, Hubert Rottleuthner, Marc Andre Wiegand. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen est, sans conteste, le juriste le plus important de ce siècle. Il n'y a pas une seule question de théorie juridique qu'on puisse traiter aujourd'hui sans examiner d'abord l'analyse qu'il en fait, mais son œuvre ne concerne pas seulement le droit et la philosophie du droit ; elle touche aussi la philosophie politique, l'épistémologie, l'éthique ou la logique. Sa théorie du droit représente, à côté du réalisme, l'une des deux branches du juspositivisme moderne, connue sous le nom de (...) normativisme et que lui-même appelait " Théorie pure du droit ". Elle se donne comme une théorie scientifique qui se borne à décrire son objet, le droit positif, et qui donc est " pure " de tout jugement de valeur. La pureté ne concerne toutefois que la méthodologie. Le droit, lui, n'est nullement pur, car il exprime des choix moraux et politiques. La doctrine kelsenienne pure apparaît ainsi doublement politique : d'une part, elle se donne pour tâche de mettre en évidence la fonction idéologique du droit ; d'autre part, dans la mesure où elle analyse les dispositifs juridiques comme des moyens au service de certaines fins, elle peut servir de fondement à une véritable technologie juridique. C'est cette technologie que Kelsen prétendait appliquer à la politique et qui fonde aussi bien son travail de constituant - il est le père de la Constitution autrichienne et de la première Cour constitutionnelle - que ses écrits sur la démocratie. La Théorie générale du droit et de l'Etat présente à cet égard un intérêt exceptionnel. Elle a été écrite aux Etats-Unis, où Kelsen s'était réfugié au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme le souligne Stanley L. Paulson dans son introduction, elle constitue une étape marquante dans l'évolution de sa pensée entre le néokantisme des origines et l'empirisme des derniers écrits. C'est aussi une présentation claire, systématique et concentrée de l'ensemble de sa doctrine et c'est le seul ouvrage de Kelsen qui porte à la fois sur les conditions de possibilité d'une science empirique du droit, sur la théorie générale du droit au sens strict - l'analyse structurale de tous les ordres juridiques possibles - et sur la théorie générale de l'Etat - l'analyse des concepts constitutifs de tout Etat possible. (shrink)

This research merges literature from organizational behavior and marketing to garner insight into how organizations can maximize the benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility for enhanced CSR and organizational engagement of employees. Across two field experiments, the authors demonstrate that the effectiveness of employee co-creation activities in increasing employees’ positive CSR perceptions is moderated by self-construal. In particular, the positive effect of co-creation on CSR perceptions emerges only for employees with a salient interdependent self-construal. Moreover, the results demonstrate that increased positive (...) CSR perceptions then predict increased CSR engagement and organizational engagement. The research thus highlights the need to consider self-construal when trying to utilize co-creation to predict CSR engagement and organizational engagement, via CSR perceptions. (shrink)

Traditionally legal theorists, whenever engaged in controversy, have agreed on one point: legal norms are par excellence rules which impose obligations. The author examines this assumption, which from another perspective (that of constitutional law, for instance) appears less obvious. In fact, constitutional rules are commoniy empowering norms, norms which do not create duties but powers. To this objection many theorists would reply that empowering rules are incomplete and that they are to be understood as parts of duty‐creating rules. A different (...) position from this traditional stance is that defended in Kelsen's later writings, according to which the fundamental type of norm is the empowering norm. The author discusses Kelsen's three theories on the “ideal form” or structure of the legal norm, with special attention to the third of these, the empowerment theory. (shrink)

First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main focus of the paper. (...) It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal “ought” in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal “ought” were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen's legal philosophy and legal theory is regarded by many in the field as the most influential theory in this century. This volume makes available some of the best work extant on Kelsens' theory, including papers newly translated into English. It covers topics such as competing philosophical positons on the nature of law, legal validity, legal powers, and the unity of municipal and international law, as well as shedding light on Kelsen's intellectual milieu and his intellectual debts.

ABSTRACTAs the title suggests, I take up three motifs in the article. Legal science, on a narrower reading, examines the law qua object of legal cognition. Substituting legal cognition for traditio...

Hans Kelsen’s purity thesis is the basic methodological principle of the Pure Theory of Law. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that virtually everything that is peculiar to Kelsen’s legal theory stems from the purity thesis. This includes Kelsen’s normativism or non‐naturalism and his polemic against various dualisms in legal science. I set out Kelsen’s position on these issues after looking at the nomenclature of purity in his writings as well as the philosophical and contextual sources of purity as (...) he understands them. (shrink)

In Section I, Kelsen introduces the legal order as an aggregate of norms and considers the question of the basis of the validity of a norm. He then turns, in Section II, to a series of questions that arise in connection with “unconstitutional” statutes. Finally, in Section III, Kelsen defends at length a monistic interpretation of the relation between the international and domestic legal orders. (Translator's summary.).

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism.

Book reviewed in this article:Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, Normativity and Norms.

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments showing that the (...) first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

The separability thesis claims that the concept of law can be explicated independently of morality, the normativity thesis, that it can be explicated independently of fact. Continental normativism, prominent above all in the work of Hans Kelsen, may be characterized in terms of the coupling of these theses. Like Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of the separability thesis. And–a leitmotiv–both theorists reject reductive legal positivism. They do not, however, reject it for the same reasons. Kelsen's reason, in (...) a word, is the normativity thesis. Hart, however, grounds his theory in social fact. In place of the reductive thesis of the legal positivist tradition, and in sharp contrast to Kelsen's normativity thesis, Hart defends a non‐reductive version of what the author terms the facticity thesis. (shrink)

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments showing that the (...) first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm —purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is (...) reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”. (shrink)

Despite far‐reaching historical and political differences, and despite legal systems that reflect altogether different traditions, the United States and Austria manifest striking similarities where some aspects of their respective development of constitutional review are concerned. For example, on the constitutional review of federalist issues (competing claims of federal and state law), the review power was there from the beginning in both countries. And both countries developed a power of constitutional review reaching to the enactments of the federal legislature. In a (...) brief sketch of aspects of the early development of constitutional review in both countries, the author looks, in particular, to the kinds of arguments made on behalf of constitutional review in the American and Austrian legal systems. (shrink)

Book reviewed:Adolf Julius Merkl, Gesammelte Schriften.